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ABSTRACT
There is a long history of discrimination against individuals 
with mental illness in the United States. Historically, individuals who 
suffer from mental illness have often been subject to disparate 
treatment in terms of health-insurance benefits. This unfortunate 
tradition comes at a price, since many individuals with untreated 
mental illness have repeated contact with the judicial system, the 
hospital emergency room, and homelessness.  
To combat the discrimination against mental illness in the 
health care system, Congress has enacted several laws; however, 
each of them has fallen short of establishing mental-health parity. 
Most recently, Congress has enacted the ACA, which provides the 
most comprehensive mental-health-parity legislation to date. 
However, HHS, the agency in charge of interpreting the ACA, has 
not uniformly or specifically defined key terms such as “mental 
illness” and “medical necessity,” which will likely result in the 
continued arbitrary application of mental-health-parity laws from 
state to state. 
Although it is difficult to achieve actual insurance parity 
because of the inherent differences between mental and physical 
illnesses, HHS can take steps towards equalization by requiring 
insurance coverage of all illnesses and disorders listed in the most 
current edition of the DSM. In addition, HHS should create a 
uniform definition of medical necessity that allows physicians to 
recommend treatment based on their professional medical opinion. If 
individual states continue to remain split on what establishes a 
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mental illness and which treatments are medically necessary, 
mental-health parity will never be achieved. 
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2009, Virginia State Senator Creigh Deeds’s 
twenty-four-year-old son, Gus, stabbed the Senator multiple times in 
the head and chest.1 Gus then committed suicide outside the family’s 
                                                
1.  Nikki Schwab, Creigh Deeds Tells Son’s Mental Health Horror Story,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/ 
washington-whispers/2014/03/31/creigh-deeds-tells-sons-mental-health-horror-story 
[https://perma.cc/2KHL-UJCM]. Senator Deeds was the 2009 Democratic 
gubernatorial nominee of Virginia. Id.
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home.2 “For the last three years of his life, Gus Deeds struggled with 
bipolar disorder.”3 Today, Creigh Deeds fights to prevent future 
tragedies by destigmatizing mental illness and changing Virginia’s 
state laws.4
Despite the spotlight on mental illness in light of similar 
tragedies,5 60% of adults with a mental illness received no treatment 
in 2012.6 Some sufferers do not realize that they are sick, but others 
simply cannot find help due to a lack of resources and mental-health 
professionals.7 In the meantime, the failure to provide treatment to 
the more than ten million Americans with serious mental illness has 
led to overburdened emergency rooms, overcrowded jails, and an 
abundance of untreated patients left to fend for themselves on the 
streets.8 In addition, recent studies have shown that “Americans 
increasingly understand mental illness to be a biological condition, 
rather than a moral failing.”9 However, Americans have become 
more inclined to believe that those with mental illness are violent or 
dangerous, which may be attributed to recent mass shootings, where 
the perpetrators suffered from mental illness.10
The current system11 used to treat mental illness in the United 
States is underfunded, ineffective, and often described as 
discriminatory because it offers less and inferior resources for the 
                                                
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Examples of similar incidents include the shootings at Virginia Tech in 
2007, at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newton, Connecticut, in 2012, and near 
the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 2014. See Liz Szabo, Cost of Not 
Caring: Stigma Set in Stone, USA TODAY (June 25, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
longform/news/nation/2014/06/25/stigma-of-mental-illness/9875351/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2WUQ-F9YF].  
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) “estimates that less than half of individuals with serious psychological 
distress receive mental health care due to various social, financial, and systemic 
barriers.” RAMYA SUNDARARAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE U.S. MENTAL 
HEALTH DELIVERY SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE: A PRIMER (2009), https://www.fas.org/ 
sgp/crs/misc/R40536.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U6T-AFYZ]. “While there have been 
advances in treatment options, the delivery system and financing mechanisms have 
been slow to transform and apply these findings in routine practice.” Id. 
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treatment of the mentally ill.12 From 2009 to 2012, individual states 
cut $5 billion from mental-health services along with 10% of 
psychiatric hospital beds.13 As the government eliminates services for 
the mentally ill, many sufferers have nowhere to go, which often 
leaves jail and the streets as the only options.14
Both individual and societal problems arise from the continued 
lack of treatment for those who suffer from mental illness.15 In 2012, 
40% of people with severe mental illness received no treatment.16
According to the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH),17
people suffering from mental illness wait about ten years after 
symptoms appear before obtaining treatment.18 There are additional 
societal costs for failing to properly treat mental illness, including the 
expenditure of criminal-justice resources.19 Untreated mental illness 
can progress to violence and other crimes, including self-medicating, 
illegal drug use.20
Congress has taken steps to decrease discrimination in terms of 
disparate insurance coverage for the treatment of mental illnesses,21
                                                
12. Szabo, supra note 5 (stating that “[a]dvocates and experts . . . describe a 
system in shambles, starved of funding while neglecting millions of people across 
the country each year”). 
13. Id.
14. Id. (explaining that “[a]s states eliminate services for the mentally ill, 
many fall through the cracks, landing in emergency rooms, jails, city streets or the 
morgue”). 
15. See id.
16. Id. Schizophrenia is an example of severe mental illness. Id. 
17. “The mission of NIMH is to transform the understanding and treatment 
of mental illnesses through basic and clinical research, paving the way for 
prevention, recovery, and cure.” About NIMH, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/index.shtml/ [https://perma.cc/M27Q-UZP3] (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2016).  
18. Szabo, supra note 5.
19. Id. (explaining that a “[m]ajority of Americans with mental illness have 
frequent contact with law enforcement”). 
20. Julie Sherwood, Shedding the Stigma: Ontario County Efforts Address 
Mental Illness, DAILY MESSENGER (June 29, 2014, 8:00 AM), http:// 
www.mpnnow.com/article/20140629/NEWS/140629655 [https://perma.cc/4FK7-59N5] 
(stating that “mental illness . . . can result in increased drug use, overcrowding in 
jails and, in extreme cases, violent rampages, which have garnered national 
attention”). For example, “[o]fficials estimate that 40 to 50 percent of the Ontario 
County Jail population is there as a direct or indirect result of mental illness—and 
drug use, as a way of self-medicating, is common.” Id.  
21. See infra Part I. These steps include the creation of Medicaid and 
Medicare in 1965, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, the Mental 
Health Parity Act (MHPA) in 1996, and the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici 
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including the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which is the latest and 
most comprehensive step.22 However, the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) must do more with its interpretation of the 
law by universally defining the key terms “mental illness” and 
“medical necessity” for all insurance plans that fall within the scope 
of the ACA to achieve actual parity between mental and physical 
illnesses.23  
Part I of this Note discusses the development of federal health 
care law in relation to the treatment of mental illness. Part II analyzes 
the current HHS interpretive rules of the ACA, which constitutes the 
latest legislative step in a long history of federal health care law. Part 
III analyzes the limitations of the ACA concerning mental-health 
parity. Finally, Part IV recommends that for the United States to 
achieve true parity between mental and physical illnesses, HHS must 
establish a specific and universal definition of the terms “mental 
illness” and “medical necessity.”
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL MENTAL-HEALTH-CARE LAW
The push for mental-health parity has a long history in 
Congress and the state legislatures.24 In fact, the federal government 
began to regulate the treatment of mental illness when it passed the 
Community Mental Health Centers Act (CMHC) in 1963, which 
resulted in the large-scale deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill.25
To encourage parity in health-insurance coverage between mental 
and physical illnesses, Congress created the Mental Health Parity 
Act (MHPA)26 in 1996 and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Act (MHPAEA)27 in 2008. Finally, in 2010, Congress enacted the 
                                                                                                      
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Act (MHPAEA) in 2008. These acts will be 
discussed in depth in Part I of this Note.  
22. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18121 (2012)).  
23. See discussion infra Part IV.  
24. Sarah Goodell, Mental Health Parity, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=112 [https://perma. 
cc/27VA-TPYF]. 
25. Community Mental Health Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, tit. II, 77 
Stat. 282.  
26. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944.  
27. Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3881 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 1185a (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (2012)).  
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ACA28 to completely reform the health care system in the United 
States.29 However, despite these efforts by the legislature, those with 
mental illness continue to suffer from the disparate treatment that is 
inherent in the health care system.30
A. What Is Parity? 
Insurance parity31 for the treatment of mental illness is difficult 
to define.32 Much of the debate surrounding the implementation of 
parity is based on the issue of determining the equivalence of 
services between mental- and physical-health benefits.33 For 
example, some treatments for mental and substance use disorders do 
not have an equivalent physical medical treatment.34 Historically, 
both private and public insurance companies have offered less 
payment coverage for mental health care than physical health care.35
Insurance benefits for mental treatment typically have their own, 
usually higher, copayments; are more restrictive on the number and 
length of treatment visits; and allow different, usually lower, annual 
and lifetime spending caps on coverage.36
First, a comprehensive mental-health-parity law will require an 
insurer to provide coverage for mental illnesses.37 In addition, it will 
prohibit insurers from implementing higher copayments and 
deductibles on mental treatment than physical treatment.38 Lastly, a
comprehensive mental-parity law will prohibit inpatient or outpatient 
                                                
28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18121 (2012)).  
29. See Goodell, supra note 24. 
30. Id.  
31. The word “parity” means “the quality or state of being equal or 
equivalent.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 901 (11th ed. 2003). 
32. See Goodell, supra note 24.
33. Id.
34. Id. (explaining that “it is difficult to determine the medical/surgical 
equivalent for a rehab stay for an acute schizophrenic episode”). 
35. Id.  
36. Id. (concluding that “[a]ltogether, these coverage rules made mental 
health benefits substantially less generous than benefits for physical health 
conditions”).
37. Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental Illness and the 
Emergence of Expansive Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 8, 15-17
(2000) (explaining the general requirements of the MHPA).  
38. See Goodell, supra note 24. 
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limitations to care and lifetime or annual dollar limits to mental-
health benefits.39
Due to the high cost of health care, the availability of insurance 
often dictates whether an individual can obtain necessary treatment.40
As a result of the disparate treatment of mental illness, many 
individuals suffering from mental illness often go without the 
treatment they require, leading advocates—and even the 
legislature—to push for the equal treatment of mental and physical 
illnesses when it comes to insurance coverage.41 Congress responded 
to this problem by enacting the MHPA in 1996, the MHPAEA in 
2008, and the ACA in 2010, which is the most expansive parity 
legislation to date.42 Although recent parity laws will increase the 
number of Americans who have access to insurance coverage for 
mental health and substance abuse treatment, critics argue that parity 
legislation alone is not enough to rectify the country’s broken 
mental-health-care system.43
B. The History of Federal Law and the Treatment of Mental Illness  
Passed in 1963, the CMHC was the largest contributing factor 
for the deinstitutionalization44 of the mentally ill in the United 
States.45 Although allegedly designed to keep the mentally ill out of 
the deplorable conditions present in state mental hospitals, the 
legislature largely supported the CMHC as a cost-saving measure.46
Tax money saved from deinstitutionalization was never spent on the 
                                                
39. See Morrison, supra note 37, at 17.  
40. See Goodell, supra note 24.
41. Id.  
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing issues such as the supply and availability of mental-health 
providers, determining equivalence of mental- and physical-health services, and 
individuals who have insurance plans not covered by the ACA).  
44. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the 
Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 
53-54, 59 (2011) (defining “deinstitutionalization” as a “dramatic reduction in 
mental hospital populations in the 1960s and 1970s”). 
45. Id. at 53-54 (explaining that the program was designed to drop the 
number of mentally ill patients in custodial care by 50%, but the number of persons 
institutionalized in state mental-health facilities actually declined by 75% from 1955 
to 1980). 
46. Ralph Slovenko, The Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Revisited, 24 
PAC. L.J. 1107, 1115-16 (1993). In fact, “[t]he community mental health program 
was sold to legislators on the basis of saving money.” Id. at 1116.  
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mentally ill in the community.47 As a result, individuals discharged 
from the closing state hospitals, many suffering from severe mental 
illness, received little to no follow-up care, resulting in the increase 
of mentally ill persons becoming homeless and incarcerated.48
In 1965, Congress created Medicaid, part of the Social Security 
Act, as a federal assistance program designed to aid the elderly and 
disabled with insufficient income for necessary medical costs.49
Ultimately, Medicaid provides states that participate in the program 
with the necessary funding to cover the medical costs for those who 
qualify.50 However, the Medicaid program contains an exclusion 
regarding Institutions for Mental Disease (IMD).51 This exclusion 
prohibits the use of federal Medicaid dollars for the care of non-
elderly, mentally ill adults in IMDs.52 For example:  
If an individual twenty-one through sixty-four years of age resides in an 
IMD, that individual is excluded from benefits under the Medicaid 
Program. If that same individual moves from the IMD to a non-IMD 
facility, that person would no longer be excluded from the Medicaid 
                                                
47. Id. at 1117.  
48. E. FULLER TORREY, ROLE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPTS TO 
IMPROVE SERVICES FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS (n.d.),
http://mentalillnesspolicy.org/media/eft/GovernmentSpendingSMIFullerTorrey.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NM6K-9Y8P] (emphasizing that “[p]rior to 1963 states were held 
responsible for the quality of [public mental illness] services; since 1963 nobody 
claims responsibility”). 
49. Susan M. Jennen, Case Note, The IMD Exclusion: A Discriminatory 
Denial of Medicaid Funding for Non-Elderly Adults in Institutions for Mental 
Diseases, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 339, 340 (1991). Medicaid is a “federal 
assistance program for ‘aged, blind, and disabled individuals, whose income and 
resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical, . . . rehabilitative, 
and other [services].’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988)).  
50. Id. at 340-41 (explaining that “[b]y setting out a ‘state plan,’ 
participating states are allowed to determine, to a certain degree, eligibility 
requirements and services to be provided”).
51. Id. at 344-45 (explaining that “[u]nlike the other classifications, IMD is 
used only for the purposes of excluding certain individuals from Medicaid 
eligibility”). The regulation states: 
Institution for mental diseases means a hospital, nursing facility, or other 
institution of more than 16 beds that is primarily engaged in providing 
diagnosis, treatment or care of persons with mental diseases, including 
medical attention, nursing care and related services. Whether an 
institution is an institution for mental diseases is determined by its 
overall character as that of a facility established and maintained primarily 
for the care and treatment of individuals with mental diseases, whether or 
not it is licensed as such. 
42 C.F.R. § 435.1010(2) (2012).  
52. Jennen, supra note 49, at 346. 
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Program. At the same time, an individual under twenty-one or over sixty-
four years of age, residing in an IMD, is not excluded from Medicaid 
Program benefits.53
Since Medicaid coverage usually requires documentation proving 
low income, it is unlikely that most Medicaid beneficiaries would be 
able to pay for the complete cost of care in an IMD or small 
residential facility, even though those types of facilities may be able 
to provide better mental-health treatment in specific cases.54
Medicare, also enacted in 1965, is a health-insurance program for 
people ages sixty-five and older.55 It also limits the amount of 
insurance coverage available for mental-illness treatment by limiting 
the amount of time that patients can receive inpatient psychiatric care 
to 190 days.56 As a result, Medicare will not cover long-term 
custodial support of the mentally ill.57
In 1990, Congress created the ADA58 to bar discrimination 
against those who suffer from a disability in employment, public 
services and accommodations, health insurance, and a variety of 
other areas.59 Although textually the ADA appears to apply to both 
physical and mental disabilities, several courts, including the United 
States Supreme Court, have curtailed the ADA’s strength regarding 
                                                
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., MEDICARE 4 (2014), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-
05-10043.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4G2-6BBJ]. In addition, “Medicare now insures the 
long-term disabled, those who require renal dialysis, and certain other persons who 
may buy into the program regardless of age.” BARRY ALEXANDER ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF HEALTH LAW 84 (5th ed. 2011).
56. JUDITH R. LAVE & HOWARD H. GOLDMAN, MEDICARE FINANCING FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH CARE 21 (1990), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/9/1/19.full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GC5P-76WS]. 
57. Id. (explaining that this “limit assures that Medicare will not pay for the 
long-term custodial support of the mentally ill”). “[B]eneficiaries with severe 
chronic mental illnesses, including chronic schizophrenia and affective disorders, 
would easily exceed 190 inpatient days over their lifetime . . . .” Stacey A. Tovino, 
All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal Mental Health Insurance
Law, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4 (2012).  
58. The ADA “provide[s a] clear and comprehensive national mandate for 
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 
12101(b)(1) (2012). 
59. Sarah Ritz, The Need for Parity in Health Insurance Benefits for the 
Mentally and Physically Disabled: Questioning Inconsistency Between Two Leading 
Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 263, 267 (2004). In her analysis of the 
text of the ADA, Ritz states that “[t]he text of the ADA appears to disallow disparity 
in health insurance benefits between the mentally and physically disabled.” Id. at 278.
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the protection of those with mental illness.60 In addition, several 
federal circuit decisions61 “have destroyed what little protection is 
provided to persons with mental-health disabilities” under the 
ADA.62 For example, in Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp.,63 the Ninth Circuit held that there is no discrimination under 
the ADA so long as the disparity in health benefits is applied to all 
employees.64 The court reasoned that historically, insurers have 
consistently distinguished between mental and physical disorders 
when offering health and disability benefits; therefore, it was 
permissible for this insurance company to continue to do so.65
To combat some of the issues concerning insurance parity and 
the disparate coverage for mental-health treatment, Congress passed 
the MHPA in 1996.66 Essentially, the MHPA regulates the lifetime 
and annual spending limits applied to mental-health-treatment 
                                                
60. Id. at 267. Ritz explains that in general, the Supreme Court has been 
successful in weakening the ADA. Id. In 1999, “the Court adopted a narrow 
understanding of the class protected by the ADA [and in] 2001 [it] held that the 
ADA’s employment title was not valid legislation under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.” Id.
61. See Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that it was far different for an insurance plan to distinguish between 
different types of disabilities—in this case, mental versus physical—than it was to 
treat an employee differently from others because of her disability); Rogers v. Dep’t 
of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 432, 437 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 
ADA only prohibited discrimination among individuals in the same class with the 
same risk and that mental disability and physical disability coverage involves 
distinct risks and hazards); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608-10 
(3d Cir. 1998) (holding that there is no requirement for parity of mental-health-
treatment benefits because equal coverage for all disabilities was not a requirement 
of the ADA); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the ADA only prohibits discrimination between the disabled and the 
non-disabled, not between various disabilities); EEOC v. CAN Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 
1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an insurance plan’s distinction between 
coverage for treatment of mental and physical illnesses was not a violation of the 
ADA because the Act did not contain sufficient language for a court to make a 
reasonable determination on the issue of mental- and physical-health parity because 
the controversy was still a matter of legislative debate). 
62. Ritz, supra note 59, at 281.  
63. 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000). In Weyer, the plaintiff, unable to work 
because of severe depression, sued her employer and her employer’s insurance 
carrier because the insurance policy only covered care for mental illness for twenty-
four months, while allowing benefits for physical disabilities until the individual 
reached the age of sixty-five. Id. at 1107-08.  
64. Id. at 1116.  
65. Id.  
66. Tovino, supra note 57, at 35-36.  
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benefits imposed by certain group-health-insurance plans,67 but only 
if the plan offers benefits for both physical and mental health.68
Furthermore, as enacted, the MHPA did not apply to individual 
health plans, Medicare, Medicaid, or any self-funded plan where the 
sponsor opted out.69 As enacted, the MHPA was not a complete or 
successful mental-health-parity law.70 In fact, nothing in the MHPA 
required an insurance plan within its scope to provide mental-health 
benefits.71 It did not offer any protection to individuals with 
substance-abuse problems, but even more problematic, it did not 
require actual mental-health parity because it did not require parity in 
terms of deductibles, copayments, day limitations for inpatient care, 
or visit limitations for outpatient care between mental- and physical-
health benefits.72 Despite Congress’s good intentions in enacting the 
MHPA, it did not actually establish comprehensive mental-health 
parity.73
To combat some of the failings in the MHPA, Congress 
enacted the MHPAEA in 2008.74 The MHPAEA expanded the 
MHPA by establishing a parity requirement on health plans within 
its scope.75 The MHPAEA required that the costs76 and treatment 
limitations77 that group health plans imposed on mental and 
substance abuse treatment be no more restrictive than the costs and 
limitations imposed on physical health benefits—essentially 
requiring parity between mental and physical treatments.78 The 
MHPAEA especially offered benefits to those who suffered from 
                                                
67. Id. at 36. “As originally enacted, MHPA only regulated insured and 
self-insured group health plans of non-small employers, defined as those employers 
that employ an average of 51 or more employees.” Id.  
68. Id.  
69. Id.  
70. Id. at 36-37.  
71. Id. at 36.  
72. Id. at 37.  
73. See id. 
74. Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 511-512, 122 Stat. 3765, 3881-93
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2012)). 
75. Tovino, supra note 57, at 37-38.  
76. Id. at 38. “[I]ncluding deductibles, copayments, coinsurance and other 
out-of-pocket expenses . . . .” Id. 
77. Id. “[I]ncluding inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations . . . .” Id. 
78. Id. (explaining “that covered group health plans imposed on mental 
health and substance use disorder benefits to be no more restrictive than the 
predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations imposed on 
substantially all physical health benefits”). 
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substance abuse problems.79 In addition, an interim final rule80
clarified questions left open by both the MHPA and MHPAEA in 
favor of patients suffering from mental-health conditions.81 The rule 
stated that a covered group health plan could not impose different 
accumulating costs or treatment limitations on mental health and 
substance abuse disorder benefits.82 The rule also concluded that a 
plan could not impose a non-quantitative treatment limitation, such 
as a medical-necessity limitation or an experimental limitation, on 
mental health and substance abuse disorder benefits.83 Overall, the 
MHPAEA was successful in establishing some mental-health-parity 
requirements and increasing access to mental-health treatments for 
some individuals.84
However, like the MHPA, the MHPAEA also suffered from 
inherent drawbacks regarding mental-health parity.85 Similar to the 
MHPA, the MHPAEA did not require a health insurance plan to 
provide any benefits for mental-health treatment.86 In addition, it 
only pertained to group health plans of “non-small employers”87 and 
did not apply to any small group or individual health plans, plans 
under Medicaid or Medicare, or any self-funded plans whose sponsor 
opted out.88 Thus, although the MHPAEA made improvements to 
federal law concerning mental-health parity, it fell short of requiring 
                                                
79. Id. at 39.  
80. See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING 
PROCESS (2011), https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_ 
process.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y793-8RH8]. The interim final rule states:  
When an agency finds that it has good cause to issue a final rule without 
first publishing a proposed rule, if often characterizes the rule as an 
“interim final rule,” or “interim rule.” This type of rule becomes effective 
immediately upon publication. In most cases, the agency stipulates that it 
will alter the interim rule if warranted by public comments. If the agency 
decides not to make changes to the interim rule, it generally will publish 
a brief final rule in the Federal Register confirming that decision.  
Id. The rule was co-released on February 2, 2010, by the Departments of Treasury, 
Labor, and Health and Human Services. See Interim Final Rules Under the Paul 
Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Penalty and Addiction Equity Act of 
2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410 (Feb. 2, 2010). 
81. Tovino, supra note 57, at 39. 
82. Id.
83. Id.  
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 38 (stating that non-small employers are those that average fifty-
one or more employees). 
88. Id.
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complete parity for most individuals with private or public insurance 
coverage.89
Two years after the enactment of the MHPAEA, Congress 
enacted the ACA in 2010, which expanded both the MHPA and the 
MHPAEA.90 Although the ACA is well known for its controversial 
health-insurance mandate for individuals, it also contains provisions 
that greatly expand parity law for mental-health benefits.91 In 
addition, it creates mandatory health benefits for mental health and 
substance abuse disorders for more individuals.92
C. The Next Step in Mental-Health-Parity Legislation: The 
Affordable Care Act  
By enacting the ACA, Congress intended to improve access to 
affordable health-insurance coverage and treatment, including 
treatment for mental illness.93 The ACA particularly aims to increase 
access to health insurance (which includes mental-health benefits), 
expand the quality and delivery of health care services, and enhance 
mental-health results.94 For instance, the ACA contains provisions 
that expand parity law and require mandatory mental health and 
substance abuse benefits for more individuals with both public and 
private health insurance.95 Ultimately, these two provisions prohibit 
health insurance plans that were previously exempt from the MHPA 
and the MHPAEA from offering fewer benefits for mental-health 
treatment.96 This includes a prohibition on higher deductibles, higher 
                                                
89. See id.
90. Id. at 39-40.  
91. Id. at 40.
92. Id. 
93. See Jasmine E. Harris, Cultural Collisions and the Limits of the 
Affordable Care Act, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 412-13 (2014).  
94. Id. (“These three areas of reform are interdependent. Improved health 
outcomes largely depend on the ACA’s success in the first two stages of improving 
access and quality of health care delivery.”). 
95. Tovino, supra note 57, at 40. Professor Tovino notes:  
The dramatic effect of [one] provision is to expand the application of 
MHPA and MHPAEA from just large group health plans to all qualified 
health plans that are offered on one of the new ACA-created state or 
regional health insurance exchanges beginning on or after January 1, 
2014. A second provision buried within ACA makes conforming and 
technical changes . . . to clarify the expansion of MHPA and MHPAEA 
to individual health insurance coverage.
Id.  
96. Id.
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copayments, and lower inpatient and outpatient treatment 
limitations.97 Another important provision prohibits health insurance 
plans from implementing lifetime or annual limits on essential health 
benefits (EHB) for any beneficiary of the plan.98
Under the ACA, federal law, for the first time, requires mental 
health and substance abuse treatment benefits in some plans; 
however, there are some limitations to the ACA.99 The ACA does not 
require grandfathered health plans100 to provide EHBs, meaning that 
these health insurance plans will continue to be governed by the 
MHPA and MHPAEA, which do not require any mental health or 
substance abuse treatment benefits.101 A grandfathered plan “is a 
group health plan or health insurance issuer that was in effect on 
March 23, 2010, the day President Obama signed [the ACA] into 
law.”102 As a result, many individuals covered by both public and 
private health insurance programs will not benefit from the ACA’s 
required mental-health-parity and substance abuse treatment 
benefits.103 However, grandfathered plans can lose their 
grandfathered status under certain conditions, including increases in 
deductibles and copayments, so they may ultimately disappear.104
                                                
97. Id.
98. Id. at 41 (“Although ACA reserves the right of a group health plan or 
health insurance coverage to impose annual and lifetime per beneficiary limits on 
specific covered benefits that are not essential health benefits, mental health and 
substance use disorder benefits, including behavioral health treatments, are 
considered essential health benefits and thus are excepted from the right of 
reservation. This third ACA provision builds on the original MHPA, which allowed 
lifetime and annual limits but only so long as such limits that applied to treatment of 
mental-health conditions were not lower than those that applied to treatment of 
physical health conditions.”). 
99. See id. at 42.  
100. Id. These plans include “the exchange-offered qualified health plan, the 
non-exchange individual health plan, the non-exchange small group health plan, the 
Medicaid benchmark plan, the benchmark-equivalent plan, and the Medicaid state 
plan settings.” Id.  
101. Id. at 44.  
102. Id. at 42.  
103. Id. at 44 (stating that “[l]arge group health plans not offered on a health 
insurance exchange, self-insured . . . plans, and . . . multiemployer welfare 
arrangements also are exempt from the essential health benefits requirement”).
104. Id. at 43. Professor Tovino states:  
Activities that will cause a grandfathered plan to lose grandfathered status 
include: (1) the elimination of all or substantially all benefits to diagnose 
or treat a particular condition; (2) any increase in a percentage cost-
sharing requirement; (3) certain increases in fixed-amount cost-sharing 
requirements, including deductibles and out-of-pocket limits but not 
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With the enactment of the ACA, Congress has taken substantial 
action toward achieving actual mental-health parity.105 The ACA 
expanded the scope of the MHPA and MHPAEA, which allowed 
more individuals to access insurance coverage for mental-health 
treatment.106 However, even with the benefits of the ACA, many 
individuals may still contend with difficult barriers when seeking 
treatment for mental disorders.107
Much of the debate regarding mental-health parity centers on 
the belief that insurance benefits should be equal for both physical 
and mental illnesses.108 Historically, in the United States, health 
insurance companies have paid less or even refused to cover 
treatment for mental illness.109 Even Medicaid and Medicare offer 
fewer benefits for mental illnesses than physical illnesses.110 As a 
result, many individuals suffering from mental illness have gone 
without necessary treatment, resulting in homelessness, criminal 
activity, and drug use.111 Congress has attempted to cure this 
discrepancy by enacting the MHPA, the MHPAEA, and most 
recently, the ACA.112 Although the ACA offers the most 
comprehensive legislation concerning mental-health parity, HHS’s 
failure to specially define the terms “mental illness” and “medical 
necessity” in the ACA will likely lead to the continuation of the 
disparate treatment of individuals suffering from mental illness.113
                                                                                                      
copayments; (4) certain increases in fixed-amount copayments; (5) certain 
decreases in contribution rates by employers and employee organizations; 
and (6) certain changes in annual limits. 
Id. 
105. See id. at 40.  
106. Id.
107. Gary Fields & Jennifer Corbett Dooren, For the Mentally Ill, Finding 
Treatment Grows Harder, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2014, 4:15 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304281004579218204163263142. 
108. See Goodell, supra note 24.
109. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116 
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that there is no discrimination under the ADA as long as the 
disparity in health benefits applied uniformly to all employees by stating that health 
insurers have “historically and consistently made distinctions between mental and 
physical illnesses in offering health and disability coverage”). 
110. See Jennen, supra note 49, at 740-41.  
111. See Szabo, supra note 5.
112. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
113. See Aubrey Chamberlin, Note, Stop the Bleeding: A Call for Clarity to 
Achieve True Mental Health Parity, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 253, 267 (2014). 
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II. HHS INTERPRETATION OF PARITY LAW UNDER THE ACA
To be covered by any insurer, a condition must be identified as 
an “illness” or “condition” deleterious to health, and the treatment 
must be determined to meet the program’s “medical necessity” 
criteria.114 The ACA is greatly limited in terms of mental-health 
parity by the lack of a specific definition of “mental illness” and 
“medical necessity.”115 On November 19, 2013, the departments of 
the Treasury, Labor, and HHS issued final regulations to reflect 
changes to the mental-health-parity requirements made to the 
MHPAEA by the ACA.116 However, the regulations failed to 
specifically define what mental-health conditions or illnesses should 
be covered by insurance plans governed by the ACA.117 Thus, such 
determinations were left to the states and individual insurance 
companies.118 Because HHS is essentially allowing the states to 
decide which mental-illness treatments to cover, the disparate 
treatment of those who suffer from mental illness will likely 
continue.119
A. HHS Interpretation of the ACA Regarding Mental Illness 
Coverage  
The ACA extended the MHPAEA to individual health 
insurance plans.120 The ACA also requires that the personal health 
insurance plans purchased through the state-run health care 
exchanges offer coverage for both mental illnesses and substance 
addiction at the same rate—or in parity—as coverage for physical 
illnesses.121 Starting in 2014, health care plans offered within the 
                                                
114. E. Haavi Morreim, Quality of Life: Erosions and Opportunities Under 
Managed Care, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 144, 146 (2000) (arguing that many of the 
problems with insurance coverage “stem[] from the fact that health plans standardly 
define their benefits coverage in terms of ‘medical necessity’”). 
115. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 260. 
116. Final Rules Under the Paul Wellston and Pete Domenici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 78 Fed. Reg. 68,239 (Nov. 13, 2013) 
[hereinafter HHS Rules]. 
117. Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 267. 
118. Id. (explaining that HHS “Secretary Sebelius gave each state the 
authority to choose an existing insurance plan to act as a specific benchmark for 
provided services”).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 266.  
121. Id.
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state exchanges must provide a package of ten EHBs, which include 
mental health and substance abuse services.122
HHS’s Final Rule regarding EHBs confirmed that “the EHB 
requirement will have to comply with the MHPAEA,” but “mental 
illness” is not specifically defined.123 For instance, the applicable 
provision of the Rule states that  
Any condition defined by the plan or coverage as being or as not being a 
mental health condition must be defined to be consistent with generally 
recognized independent standards of current medical practice (for 
example, the most current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM), the most current version of the ICD, or State 
guidelines).124
Although the rules offer some limitations to states’ ability to limit 
insurance coverage for mental illness, the rules allow states to create 
their own definition of “mental illness” as long as it is “consistent 
with generally recognized independent standards of current medical 
practice.”125 HHS also declined to create a list or define the 
treatments that will require coverage.126 As it currently stands, each 
state is given the authority to designate one existing health care plan 
as the standard for covered services.127 In addition, health-care-plan 
providers will have to comply with the MHPAEA, the ACA, and any 
applicable state laws, which may require more coverage.128 However, 
without a more concrete definition of “mental illness,” many 
individuals with mental illness will continue to suffer from disparate 
treatment depending on where they live.129
B. Mental Illness—As Defined by the States  
Although the ACA requires that all insurance plans within its 
scope provide coverage for mental-health treatments, it does not 
specifically define “mental illness.”130 States have defined mental 
illness in several different ways due to the lack of direction from the 
federal government.131 For example, Arkansas defines “mental 
                                                
122. Id.  
123. Id. at 267.  
124. HHS Rules, supra note 116, at 68,267.  
125. See id. at 68,242. 
126. Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 267. 
127. Id.
128. Id.  
129. Id.  
130. See id. at 260. 
131. Id. 
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illness” as all mental illnesses and disorders that are listed in the 
International Classification of Diseases Manual (ICD)132 and the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).133 On 
the other hand, Iowa law mandates insurance coverage for only 
“biologically based mental illness,”134 which includes a list of the 
following: schizophrenia, bipolar disorders, major depressive 
disorders, schizo-affective disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
pervasive developmental disorders, and autistic disorders.135
However, Iowa law excludes mental disorders such as anorexia.136
Finally, Maryland does not specifically define “mental illness,” but 
provides that insurance benefits are required “only for expenses 
arising from the treatment of mental illnesses, emotional disorders, 
drug abuse, or alcohol abuse” if a health care provider deems the 
illness or disorder as treatable and the treatment is “medically 
necessary.”137 Since states define mental illness in different ways, the 
availability of mental-health benefits may depend on where an 
individual resides.138
Several state parity laws distinguish between “biologically 
based” and “non-biologically based” mental illnesses, or between 
“severe” and “non-severe” disorders.139 For example, Nevada only 
requires insurance coverage for the treatment of six mental disorders 
that it defines as “biologically based” and “severe.”140 This list is 
                                                
132. The ICD “is the standard diagnostic tool for epidemiology, health 
management and clinical purposes.” Classifications, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ [https://perma.cc/7R2V-5ELV] (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2016). It is used by a variety of health care professionals to classify 
diseases and other health problems. Id. The ICD is currently in its tenth version; 
however, it is currently under revision, and the release date for ICD-11 is expected 
in 2018. Id.
133. The DSM “is the standard classification of mental disorders used by 
mental health professionals in the United States.” DSM, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm [https://perma.cc/V3GJ-2PGP] (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2016). It is currently in its fifth edition. Id.; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-
99-503(6)(A) (West 2009).  
134. There is no scientific basis to distinguish biologic and non-biologic 
mental disorders. Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y, 455, 499 (2011) (explaining that “[c]urrent science 
shows that almost all mental health conditions and substance use disorders have 
been reported by scientists to have some type of basis in neurobiology”). 
135. IOWA CODE § 514C.22(3) (2016).  
136. Id.; see also Tovino, supra note 134, at 499.  
137. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-802(d)(1)(i)-(ii) (LexisNexis 2015). 
138. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 261.  
139. Tovino, supra note 134, at 499-500.  
140. Id. at 469. 
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comprised of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar 
disorder, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, and obsessive-
compulsive disorder.141 On the other hand, Idaho requires parity for 
individuals who suffer from one of seven “serious mental illnesses,” 
which include schizophrenia, paranoia, and other psychotic 
disorders; bipolar disorders; major depressive disorders; 
schizoaffective disorders; panic disorders; and obsessive-compulsive 
disorders.142 However, disorders such as post-traumatic stress 
disorder, eating disorders, and autism are often absent from these 
lists of “severe” and “biologically based” disorders even though 
there is a possibility of these disorders becoming severe, and recent 
research suggests that these disorders have a biological basis.143 Even 
when states use a similar approach to define mental illness—such as 
utilizing the “severe” or “biologically-based” designation—the list of 
covered illnesses can diverge greatly.144
There can also be differences in how two states define the same 
mental illness.145 For instance, both Delaware and Vermont require 
insurance benefits for treatment of all mental disorders specified in a 
specific medical organization’s manual.146 Delaware requires 
coverage of a list of nine “serious” mental illnesses that are set out in 
the most recent edition of the DSM.147 On the other hand, Vermont 
mandates coverage of any “mental health condition” that is included 
in the current ICD’s mental-disorders section.148 Although this 
difference might not appear to be initially significant, it may dictate 
when an individual can begin receiving treatment.149 For example, for 
a diagnosis of Bipolar I disorder under the DSM-V as used in 
Delaware, it is necessary for the patient to have experienced a manic 
episode lasting at least one week.150 However, Vermont’s use of the 
ICD-10 requires the patient to have at least two manic episodes 
                                                
141. NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0455(2) (2014).  
142. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5761A (West 2006).
143. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 499.  
144. See id. at 497-98. 
145. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 261.  
146. Id. (explaining that “[w]hile a large number of disorders will be covered 
under the language of such statutes, the diagnostic criteria for mental illness, and the 
illnesses covered, will vary depending on which organization’s manual is utilized”).
147. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3578(a)(3) (1999).  
148. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b(b)(2) (2011).  
149. Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 261. 
150. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 123-24 (5th ed. 2013).  
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before diagnosis.151 According to the DSM-V, a manic episode may 
include an increase in goal-directed activity, psychomotor agitation, 
or excessive involvement in activities that have a high potential for 
disastrous consequences—such as unrestrained shopping sprees, 
risky sexual behavior, or irrational business investments.152 A manic 
episode could potentially cause irreparable social, financial, and 
bodily harm to an individual.153 However, an individual in Delaware 
could obtain treatment after one manic episode, while an individual 
living in Vermont would have to experience at least two manic 
episodes before obtaining treatment.154 Both Delaware and Vermont 
use an independent medical organization manual as a basis for their 
definition of “mental illness”; however, even medical organizations 
can differ in their definitions of specific mental illnesses, which may 
lead to disagreement as to when the criteria for a specific illness is 
met.155
Because of the lack of a standardized definition of mental 
illness, whether and when an individual will receive treatment will 
vary depending on where that individual lives.156 Even with the 
additional parity requirements contained in the ACA, states are likely 
to limit the variety of illnesses included in health care legislation in 
the interest of keeping costs at a minimum.157 However, the 
legislative discrepancies do not end with the definition of “mental 
illness”; an additional issue with current parity legislation involves 
the lack of a specific, universal definition of what constitutes a 
“medical necessity.”158
C. Medical Necessity—As Defined by Insurance Companies  
The coverage standard for many individual health care plans is 
whether treatment for the mental illness constitutes a “medical 
                                                
151. WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF 
DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS 10TH REVISION (2010), http://apps.who. 
int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en#/F30-F39 [https://perma.cc/V4GX-F5QV].
152. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 150, at 124. 
153. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 261. 
154. Id.
155. See id. 
156. See id. at 263-64. 
157. Id. at 264 (asserting that there will never be true parity between physical 
and mental illnesses “if insurance companies and various state legislators continue 
to craft their own definitions of mental illness”). 
158. See id. 
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necessity.”159 Similar to the problems with defining “mental illness,” 
HHS has not offered much guidance in terms of what constitutes a 
“medical necessity.”160 The HHS rules interpreting the ACA vaguely 
define “medical necessity” as “[h]ealth care services or supplies 
needed to prevent, diagnose or treat an illness, injury, disease or its 
symptoms and that meets accepted standards of medicine.”161
Furthermore, individual states and insurance companies may 
continue to use their own definitions of “medical necessity,” leading 
to disagreement among physicians, courts, and insurance companies 
as to what constitutes a “medical necessity.”162
Some states, such as Oregon, simply allow insurance providers 
to craft their own definition of medical necessity and apply it to both 
physical and medical conditions.163 However, this approach may 
cause issues with parity because basic treatment for physical 
illnesses can vary widely from an appropriate treatment for a mental 
illness.164 Other states, such as Massachusetts, have created a broad 
definition, stating “medical necessity” constitutes health care 
“services that are consistent with generally accepted principles of 
professional medical practice.”165
Similar to Oregon, several states,166 including Alabama, 
Indiana, Idaho, and Texas, have not created a state definition of 
                                                
159. Id. The final rules interpreting how the ACA affects the MHPAEA state 
that the “MHPAEA requires that the criteria for plan medical necessity 
determinations with respect to mental health or substance use disorder benefits . . . 
be made available . . . to any current or potential participant.” HHS Rules, supra 
note 116, at 68,247. The MHPAEA “also requires that the reason for any denial 
under the plan . . . [for] reimbursement or payment services with respect to mental 
health or substance use” benefits “must be made available on request . . . to the 
participant or beneficiary.” Id.  
160. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 264. 
161. Glossary of Health Insurance and Medical Terms, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,529 
(Aug. 22, 2011). 
162. Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 264. However, the rules do offer that 
benefits must “be consistent with generally recognized independent standards of 
current medical practice.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R § 2590.712(a) (2012)). 
163. OR. ADMIN. R. 836-053-1405 (2015).  
164. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 265 (arguing that “[w]ithout 
considering the unique nature of mental-health-care services, some medically 
necessary treatments are not likely” to be covered under such a statute). 
165. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176O, § 1 (2015).  
166. About thirty-three states have not created a definition of medical 
necessity. SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., MEDICAL NECESSITY IN PRIVATE HEALTH 
PLANS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CARE 56-63 (2003), https:// 
publichealth.gwu.edu/departments/healthpolicy/DHP_Publications/pub_uploads/dhp
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mental illness, meaning that the term is typically defined in 
individual insurance contracts.167 As a result, the determinations of 
which treatments constitute a “medical necessity” are made by 
insurers and not by physicians.168 However, some private insurance 
companies169 and a few states170 have modeled their definition of 
“medical necessity” on the American Medical Association’s (AMA) 
definition, which states that “medical necessity” consists of: 
Health care services or products that a prudent physician would provide to 
a patient for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing or treating an illness, 
injury, disease or its symptoms in a manner that is: (a) in accordance with 
generally accepted standards of medical practice; (b) clinically appropriate 
in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and duration; and (c) not primarily 
for the economic benefit of the health plans and purchasers or for the 
convenience of the patient, treating physician, or other health care 
provider.171
In fact, major national insurance companies Aetna, CIGNA, Health 
Net, Prudential, Anthem/WellPoint, and Humana adopted the 
AMA’s definition of medical necessity as part of a large settlement 
with over 900,000 physicians and governmental medical societies as 
a result of a consolidated class-action lawsuit.172 The lawsuits 
contended that these insurers engaged in a conspiracy to improperly 
deny payment to physicians by engaging in several types of improper 
conduct, including failure to pay for “medically necessary” 
                                                                                                      
Publication_3A45C497-5056-9D20-3DAA24F165B5678A.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4QS5-C7DE].  
167. Id. at 1.  
168. Id.
169. See CIGNA, CIGNA STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES/MEDICAL NECESSITY 
CRITERIA 7 (2015), http://apps.cignabehavioral.com/web/basicsite/media/consumer/ 
educationAndResourceCenter/medicalNecessityCriteria.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A8V-
TU2L]; see also AETNA, BEHAVIORAL HEALTH PROVIDER MANUAL 3 (2015),
https://www.aetnaeducation.com/ihtml/application/upload/9516.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/WT2N-ECS2]. 
170. See, e.g., 18 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 1300(2) (2007); FLA. STAT. §
627.732(2) (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4301-A (10-A) (2001).  
171. AMA, STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION TO THE 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE’S COMMITTEE ON DETERMINATION OF ESSENTIAL HEALTH 
BENEFITS 3 (2011), http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/ 
HealthServices/EssentialHealthBenefits/2011-JAN-13%20and%2014/Gerald% 
20Harmon%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGE4-D8EU]. 
172. See In re Managed Care Litig., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 
2003); Janet L. Kaminski, Defining Medical Necessity, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Feb. 
23, 2007), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/rpt/2007-r-0055.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
K7Q3-6EZP] (explaining that “[t]he settlements were approved at various times 
between 2003 and 2006”). 
Discrimination and Mental Illness 291
services.173 Under the terms of the settlement, each company agreed 
to create a definition of “medical necessity,” modeled on the AMA 
definition.174
On the other hand, some insurers define “medical necessity” as 
services, tests, and procedures that are “medically appropriate and 
cost-effective for the individual member.”175 Similarly, Medicare 
provides that “no payment may be made . . . for items and services 
. . . [that] are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or 
treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a 
malformed body member.”176 How an insurer defines medical 
necessity can have a large impact on what treatments an individual 
can afford.177 Due to the high costs of medical care for both physical 
and mental disorders, whether an individual receives treatment that is 
deemed necessary by a physician is heavily influenced by the 
availability of insurance coverage.178
Courts, physicians, and insurance companies often differ on the 
definition of medical necessity, which can lead to the denial of 
claims for treatment and litigation.179 For example, in Harlick v. Blue 
Shield of California,180 the plaintiff, suffering from extreme anorexia, 
checked into a residential treatment facility at 65% of her ideal body 
weight and required the insertion of a feeding tube.181 The defendant 
insurance company later refused payment for the plaintiff’s treatment 
because it was conducted at a residential facility, which was not 
covered by the plaintiff’s plan.182 The Ninth Circuit held that 
although the plaintiff’s insurance plan would not require treatment 
for her anorexia because the plan did not cover residential treatment, 
the state’s parity law183 would require the plan to pay for the 
                                                
173. Kaminski, supra note 172.
174. Id.
175. UNITED HEALTHCARE, MEDICAL NECESSITY FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS (2011), https://www.uhctools.com/assets/M50195-B%20Member% 
20FAQs%20Medical%20Necessity.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH5Q-FMN7].  
176. 42 U.S.C § 1395y(a) (2012).  
177. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 166, at 3.  
178. Id.  
179. Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 264-66.  
180. 686 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2012).  
181. Id. at 703-04.  
182. Id. at 705-06. The insurance company first stated that the reason for the 
denial of payment was based on plaintiff’s failure to prove her treatment was a 
medical necessity, then stated the company’s refusal was due to the fact that 
plaintiff’s plan did not cover any type of residential treatment. Id.
183. Id. at 710. The state’s parity law is the California Mental Health Parity 
Act, which was enacted in 1999. Id.
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treatment if it was a medical necessity.184 The court reasoned that, 
based on the language of the parity law, all health insurance plans 
within the scope of the parity law185 must cover all medically 
necessary treatment for severe mental illnesses, including anorexia, 
under the same financial terms applied to physical illnesses.186 The 
court deferred to plaintiff’s doctors and explained that plaintiff’s 
treatment constituted a medical necessity because her doctors 
believed that outpatient care was inadequate since she was only at 
65% of her ideal body weight and required the insertion of a feeding 
tube.187
The term “medical necessity” is defined in various ways by 
states, physicians, and insurance companies.188 As a result, courts, 
physicians, and insurance companies may disagree as to what 
treatments constitute a “medical necessity,” which leads to claim 
denials and even expensive litigation.189 Without more guidance from 
the HHS, this disparate treatment will likely continue at the expense 
of mental-health-treatment access.190
The ACA has extended mental-health parity to most personal-
insurance plans.191 However, HHS, in interpreting the ACA, has not 
concretely defined either “mental illness” or “medical necessity.”192
By leaving such important definitions to the states and insurance 
companies, some individuals suffering from mental illness and 
substance abuse disorders will continue to receive inferior treatment 
or no insurance benefits for treatment.193 However, some individual 
state and organizational approaches are superior to others and may 
serve as a model for HHS when promulgating additional rules under 
the ACA.194
                                                
184. Id. California has determined that a service is “‘medically necessity’ 
when it is reasonable and necessary to protect life, to prevent significant illness or 
significant disability, or to alleviate severe pain.” CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
14059.5 (West 2016).
185. Harlick, 686 F.3d at 721. In this case, it was undisputed that plaintiff’s 
health insurance plan was within the scope of the state parity law. Id.  
186. Id. 
187. Id.
188. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 266. 
189. See id.
190. Id. 
191. Id.  
192. Id. at 267.  
193. Id.  
194. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 495.  
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III. LIMITATIONS OF THE ACA IN TERMS OF MENTAL-HEALTH 
PARITY
The ACA offers the most comprehensive protection to those 
suffering with mental illness to date because it expands the 
MHPAEA to almost all health care plans and requires that most 
insurance plans cover treatments for mental illness as part of the ten 
required EHBs.195 However, because the rules promulgated by the 
HHS do not specially define terms such as “mental illness” or 
“medical necessity,” it is likely that people suffering with mental 
illness will not obtain actual parity because states and insurance 
companies will differ on how to define these terms in practice.196
Because of the wide variance in state and insurer definitions of the 
terms, those who desperately require treatment may obtain different 
treatment—or even no treatment—depending on the state in which 
they reside even though the ACA is a federally promulgated law.197
The lack of insurance coverage can have a large impact on an 
individual suffering with mental illness.198 In general, availability of 
insurance heavily influences whether an individual suffering from a 
mental disorder will receive necessary treatment because mental-
health treatments are often expensive and long term, especially in the 
case of chronic conditions.199 As a result, coverage decisions made by 
insurers and state legislatures, including how “mental illness” and 
“medical necessity” are defined, are essential to the determination of 
whether individuals will have access to appropriate treatment.200
A. Issues with Defining Mental Illness  
Although the ACA includes mental-health coverage as one of 
the ten necessary EHBs for insurance plans under its scope, the HHS 
rules interpreting the law do not offer a specific definition of “mental 
illness.”201 Because of the lack of a federally promulgated definition 
of this key term, states and individual insurance companies have 
                                                
195. Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 259-60.
196. Id. at 263-64.  
197. See id. at 264.  
198. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 166, at 3.  
199. Id.
200. Id. 
201. Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 256 (arguing that “[c]ontrary to the 
intent of federal parity legislation, insurance providers continue to offer disparate 
coverage of mental and physical disorders due to a lack of clarity as to what 
constitutes a mental illness and which treatments are medically necessary”).
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created their own definitions that may vary greatly.202 In fact, despite 
the historically inferior treatment of mental illness in the United 
States, most individual states have created mental-health-parity laws 
to decrease insurance-benefit inequalities for mental illness.203
However, these state-parity laws diverge greatly in application.204
For instance, some state mental-health-parity laws mandate 
insurance coverage of almost all psychiatric or intellectual 
disorders.205 Other states have limited coverage to a short list of 
“traditional” disorders, which have a historical backing in medical 
literature and are often referenced as “biologically based” or 
“severe” disorders.206 States with statutes requiring insurance 
coverage of almost all psychiatric or intellectual disorders will cover 
all “biologically based” or “severe” disorders, in addition to many 
others, which means that states in the first instance provide increased 
access to mental-health treatments.207 Lastly, there are states that 
have created their own definition of mental illness.208 As a result of 
the widely varying approaches in defining “mental illness” by the 
states, the availability of insurance benefits for the treatment of 
mental disorders may also vary greatly based solely upon where the 
individual lives.209
1. Vermont 
Vermont’s health-parity law210 is an example of a state law 
requiring insurance coverage of a wide variety of mental disorders.211
It is devised to cover almost any “psychiatric, neurological, 
substance abuse, developmental, or intellectual disorder” that is 
listed in the current version of the ICD.212 The law aims to recognize 
                                                
202. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 457-58.  
203. Id. at 457.  
204. Id. at 458.  
205. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-503(6)(A) (West 2009); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b (2011).  
206. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3578(a)(3) (2007); IOWA CODE §
514C.22(3) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0455 (2014). 
207. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 457-58. 
208. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-802 (LexisNexis 2014); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 417-E:1 (2011). 
209. See ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 166, at 3. 
210. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b. 
211. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 458. 
212. See id. Professor Tovino states:  
Chapter V of the 10th revision of the ICD classifies dozens of mental 
disorders within eleven broad categories, including: (i) organic mental 
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treatment for mental conditions as an essential part of health care and 
guarantee that insurance plans cover all necessary treatments, which 
includes both physical- and mental-health-treatment services.213 This 
law regulates all health insurance plans provided by private insurers 
as well as plans administered by the state.214 In addition, the law 
requires all health insurance plans to cover treatment of a “mental 
condition.”215 This type of provision makes the Vermont law a 
mandated-benefit law, which requires all plans to provide a 
mandated benefit.216 In general, mandated-benefit laws protect plan 
beneficiaries from adverse selection, which in the context of mental-
health benefits is the concern that plans that provide benefits for 
mental-health treatments will appeal to those who have more mental-
health-care needs.217 The idea is that this leads to increased costs for 
insurers offering mental-health benefits.218 However, Vermont’s law 
reduces adverse selection concerns because all plans are required to 
offer mental-health benefits so one plan presumably will not appeal 
more to an individual who suffers from mental illness than another.219
By mandating that all plans provide mental-health benefits, Vermont 
                                                                                                      
disorders, such as Alzheimer’s disease; (ii) substance use disorders, 
including alcohol abuse; (iii) schizophrenia, schizotypal and delusional 
disorders, including paranoid schizophrenia; (iv) mood disorders, 
including bipolar disorder; (v) neurotic, stress-related, and somatoform 
disorders, including obsessive-compulsive disorder; (vi) behavioral 
syndromes associated with physiological disturbances and physical 
factors, including eating disorders; (vii) adult behavioral and personality 
disorders, including pathological gambling; (viii) mental retardation, 
including mild, moderate, and severe retardation; (ix) disorders of 
psychological development, including autism; (x) behavioral and 
emotional disorders with onset usually occurring in childhood and 
adolescence, including attention deficit disorder; and (xi) other mental 
disorders not otherwise specified. 
Id. at 464-65; see WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 151, at ch. V. The eleven 
different mental disorder classifications range from F00-F99. Id. 
213. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b(a).  
214. Id. § 4089b(b)(1). 
215. Id. § 4089b(c). 
216. Tovino, supra note 134, at 463. Here, the mandated benefit is coverage 
for mental illness treatment. Id. Conversely, “[m]andated offer laws . . . only require 
health insurance plans to provide an offer, or an option, of coverage for a particular 
condition (here, mental illness) that the prospective insured is free to accept or 
reject.” Id. at 464. “If the insured accepts the offered benefit, the plan usually will 
require the insured to pay an additional or higher premium.” Id.  
217. Id.  
218. Id. (explaining that “[h]istorically, many insurers have not offered 
mental health benefits as a way of controlling for adverse selection”).
219. Id.
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ensures that more individuals have access to mental-health treatment, 
which increases mental-health parity.220
The Vermont law also provides additional benefits and 
protections for individuals suffering from mental illness.221 It 
provides that beneficiaries may only be asked to pay one combined 
deductible or out-of-pocket limit for both physical and mental 
treatments.222 In addition, the law prevents insurance plans from 
excluding any authorized mental health or substance abuse providers 
located within the geographic area of the coverage area of the plan 
from the plan’s network, as long as the provider meets the insurer’s 
requirements for participation.223 This provision is considered an 
“any willing provider” provision, which prevents insurance plans
from refusing to allow mental-health-care workers into their 
networks.224 Such a provision guarantees access to providers with 
mental-health expertise—and that insurers cannot agree to parity in 
theory only to offer a network with no authorized mental-health-care 
providers.225
Because Vermont requires that all insurers provide coverage 
for the treatment of all mental conditions listed in the current version 
of the ICD, an individual suffering from any of those conditions will 
have increased funding and access to necessary treatment.226
Vermont’s parity law establishes comprehensive mental-health parity 
because it provides insurance coverage for a wide variety of 
conditions listed in an independent medical organization’s manual 
instead of limiting coverage to a list of five or six “biologically 
based” or “severe” illnesses.227 Although the Vermont parity law 
offers extensive protection to individuals suffering from a mental 
disorder, other states have taken a narrower approach, especially 
concerning the definition of “mental illnesses.”228  
                                                
220. See id.  
221. See id. at 465.  
222. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b(c) (2011) (stating that “[a] health 
insurance plan shall . . . make any deductible or out-of-pocket limits required under 
a health insurance plan comprehensive for coverage of both mental health and 
physical health conditions”).
223. Id. § 4089b(c)(2). 
224. Tovino, supra note 134, at 465-66. 
225. Id.
226. See tit. 8, § 4089b(b)(2).  
227. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 461.  
228. See id. (explaining that Vermont’s parity law “implement[s] 
comprehensive mental health parity,” while the laws of Nevada “allow inferior 
mental health insurance benefits”). 
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2. Nevada 
The State of Nevada limits its parity laws to a list of 
“traditional” mental illnesses.229 These mental illnesses are usually 
referred to as “biologically based” or “severe” and typically include 
disorders such as major depression, bipolar disorder, and 
schizophrenia.230 However, mental disorders such as autism, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and eating disorders are usually excluded 
from lists of “biologically based” and “severe” mental illnesses.231 As 
a result, an individual suffering from anorexia may be unable to 
obtain insurance coverage for treatment simply because Nevada’s list 
of “biologically based” and “severe” disorders excludes anorexia.232
The distinction between “biologically based” and “non-biologically 
based” mental illnesses is not supported by scientific research, and it 
is unclear how the “biologically based” illnesses were selected.233
Although Nevada’s parity law provides for the protection of those 
suffering from the six disorders listed in the statute, an individual 
suffering from a wide variety of other disorders—such as post-
traumatic stress syndrome or anorexia—is offered no protection.234
Similar to the Vermont parity law, the Nevada law contains 
language comparable to a mandated-benefit provision because it 
requires an insurer to provide for the treatment of “severe mental 
illness.”235 However, because the Nevada law only requires coverage 
of the six disorders that the state has deemed to be “severe,” it may 
be referred to as a limited mandated law.236 In addition, in 2011, 
Nevada passed a provision that requires health insurance plans to 
offer an option—not a mandate—for coverage for screening, 
diagnosis, and treatment of autism-spectrum disorders237 for children 
                                                
229. See id.
230. NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0455(2) (2014). Nevada’s parity law requires 
insurance health plans to cover the following six disorders: schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorders, panic 
disorders, and obsessive-compulsive disorder for which diagnostic criteria are 
prescribed in the most recent edition of the DSM. Id.
231. Tovino, supra note 134, at 458.
232. See id.  
233. Id. at 499.  
234. See id. 
235. NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0455(2).
236. Tovino, supra note 134, at 460.  
237. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0435(1) (2015). The autism spectrum 
disorders include “autistic disorder, Asperger’s Disorder and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.” Id. § 689A.0435(7)(c).
298 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
under eighteen and individuals enrolled in high school who are under 
the age of twenty-two.238 Although Nevada mandates insurance 
benefits for six “severe” mental disorders in addition to requiring an 
option for the coverage of autism screening and treatment for minors, 
it offers significantly less protection to individuals with mental 
illnesses than Vermont because Vermont’s parity law allows a 
broader application for mental-health-insurance coverage.239
3. Maryland 
Finally, Maryland is an example of a state that has created its 
own definition of “mental illness.”240 Maryland’s parity statute 
provides that mental illnesses, emotional disorders, and drug and 
alcohol abuse disorders are covered if deemed treatable and 
medically necessary in the professional judgment of a health care 
provider.241 Like Vermont’s parity statute, Maryland’s statute may be 
classified as a mandated-benefit law because it requires insurers to 
provide mental-health benefits.242 However, unlike both Vermont and 
Nevada, Maryland does not refer to a medical manual, such as the 
ICD or the DSM, in its definition of “mental illness.”243 Instead, 
Maryland makes a broad reference to mental, emotional, and drug 
and alcohol abuse disorders.244 Although Maryland’s parity law 
appears to offer insurance coverage for almost any type of mental or 
substance abuse disorder, it is unclear whether it covers intellectual 
or developmental disorders, including autism, attention-deficit 
disorder, and mental retardation.245 Generally, Maryland’s parity law 
offers more protection for individuals with mental illness than 
Nevada’s limited-parity statute due to the Maryland statute’s broad 
definition; however, its definition of “mental illness” is less clear 
than Vermont’s as applied to specific intellectual or developmental 
disorders.246
Because of these differing state parity statutes, the availability 
of insurance coverage for the treatment of different mental disorders 
                                                
238. Id. § 689A.0435(1).
239. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 461.  
240. See id. at 467.  
241. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-802(d)(1)(i)-(ii) (LexisNexis 2014). 
242. Tovino, supra note 134, at 467.  
243. Id. 
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id. at 461.  
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can vary depending on where an individual lives.247 The ACA is a 
federal law that affects health-insurance benefits in all states.248
However, many individuals may be unable to obtain necessary 
treatment due to inadequate insurance benefits because the definition 
of “mental illness” varies so widely from state to state.249 In addition, 
the lack of a concrete definition of “medical necessity” can also lead 
to the disparate treatment of those who suffer from mental illness and 
disagreement among physicians, insurers, and courts.250
B. Issues with Defining Medical Necessity  
The lack of a specific federal definition of “medical necessity” 
may also have a substantial impact on which treatments are available 
for individuals suffering from mental illness.251 The American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) has adopted the American Medical 
Association’s (AMA) definition of “medical necessity.”252 However, 
only slightly more than one-third of states have created any statewide 
regulatory definition of medical necessity, which means that the term 
is usually defined in individual insurance contracts.253 For example, 
Oregon allows individual insurance companies to craft their own 
definitions and apply them to both physical and medical 
conditions.254 As a result, insurers, rather than medical professionals, 
often define which treatments are medically necessary.255 In addition, 
this approach may cause issues regarding mental-health parity 
because some treatments for mental illness do not have an equivalent 
physical medical treatment.256 For instance, comprehensive 
substance-abuse-treatment programs do not have a comparable 
physical treatment.257 It is also challenging to determine the physical 
                                                
247. See id. at 457.  
248. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 266.  
249. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 456.  
250. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 166, at 1. 
251. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 266.  
252. MARTIN FLEISHMAN, THE CASEBOOK OF A RESIDENTIAL CARE 
PSYCHIATRIST: PSYCHOPHARMACOSOCIOECONOMICS AND THE TREATMENT OF 
SCHIZOPHRENIA IN RESIDENTIAL CARE FACILITIES (1st ed. 2005); see infra Section 
IV.B.  
253. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 166, at 1.  
254. OR. ADMIN. R. 836-053-1405 (2015). 
255. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 166, at 1 (“[T]he meaning of ‘medical 
necessity’ is most commonly found in individual insurance contracts that are defined 
by the insurer and hold primacy in most determinations.”). 
256. Goodell, supra note 24. 
257. Id.
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equivalent for the inpatient treatment of an acute schizophrenic 
episode.258 As a result, some treatments that are specific to mental 
illness may not be eligible for insurance coverage.259
Like “mental illness,” the varying definitions of the term 
“medical necessity” can also result in a difference in insurance 
coverage depending on where an individual lives or the insurance 
that they have.260 In most states, the term is defined by insurance 
carriers and not by actual physicians.261 In addition, courts, insurers, 
and physicians often disagree on what constitutes a “medical 
necessity,” which may lead to an individual not receiving necessary 
treatment because an insurer simply denies coverage and the 
individual cannot otherwise afford treatment.262
The ACA offers the greatest protection to date in terms of 
mental-health parity, but falls short by not defining the key terms 
“mental illness” and “medical necessity.”263 As a result, individuals 
suffering from mental illness may still receive disparate treatment in 
terms of insurance coverage depending on where they live and the 
insurance company from which they receive benefits.264 However, 
although it will be difficult to achieve actual mental-health parity, 
HHS can take additional steps under the ACA that will greatly 
improve access to mental-health treatment.265 HSS should 
specifically define “mental illness” and “medical necessity” in order 
to increase access to mental-health treatment at the national level.266
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE MENTAL-HEALTH PARITY
Currently, the availability of insurance coverage for treatment 
depends on the state in which the individual lives.267 For example, a 
person suffering from schizophrenia would be able to obtain 
insurance coverage for treatment in Vermont, Nevada, and 
                                                
258. Id.
259. See id.  
260. ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 166, at 1. 
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 259-60. 
264. See id. at 266; ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 166, at 1. 
265. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 467. 
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Maryland268 because schizophrenia is included in the ICD, Nevada’s 
list of “severe” and “biologically based” disorders, and Maryland’s 
broad definition of mental illness.269 However, a person suffering 
from a mental disorder, such as post-traumatic stress disorder, may 
only obtain treatment coverage in Vermont and Maryland because 
post-traumatic stress disorder is included in the ICD and Maryland’s 
broad definition, but not in Nevada’s list of “biologically based” 
disorders.270 Finally, an individual with a developmental disorder, 
such as autism, may only obtain treatment coverage in Vermont and 
Nevada because autism is included in the ICD and Nevada’s 2011 
provision, but it is unclear whether Maryland’s statute covers 
intellectual disorders, such as autism.271
Although true mental-health parity will be difficult to achieve 
with the vast differences between mental and physical illnesses, HHS 
can take additional steps to improve access to insurance coverage for 
mental-health services for those who are suffering from debilitating 
mental disorders.272 By specifically defining “mental illness” and 
“medical necessity,” HHS can improve mental-health parity and help 
those who are in need of help receive necessary treatment.273
Essentially, the ACA will never achieve mental-health parity without 
specifically defining these two terms.274
A. Define Mental Illness at the Federal Level  
Both insurance companies and states will likely continue to 
define mental illness in various ways, which will result in the 
continued disparate treatment of those with mental illness.275
However, HHS should adopt a clear, useable definition of “mental 
illness” for all insurance plans within the scope of the ACA to 
improve the availably of insurance coverage to all individuals 
                                                
268. Treatment would be covered as long as a health care professional 
deemed treatment a medical necessity. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
802(d)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis 2014). 
269. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 457-58, 467. 
270. See id. (explaining the differences in various state parity statutes). 
Private insurance companies, however, can provide a more comprehensive 
definition of mental illness in their individual plans. See id. 
271. See id. at 467. 
272. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 276.  
273. See id.; Szabo, supra note 5. See generally Goodell, supra note 24. 
274. See Chamberlin, supra note 113, at 276; Tovino, supra note 134, at 491. 
275. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 457.  
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suffering from mental illness.276 To achieve this, HHS should adopt a 
definition of “mental illness” that includes all psychiatric or 
psychological conditions classified in the most current edition of the 
DSM.277
The DSM is already widely used by health care providers, 
insurance companies, and state parity laws.278 In fact, the HHS rules 
interpreting the ACA listed the DSM as one of the available options 
for states to craft their own definition of “mental illness.”279 The use 
of the current edition of the DSM to define “mental illness” will 
offer broad protection for individuals who suffer from mental illness 
because it includes all mental disorders that are currently recognized 
by the APA.280 Each disorder in the DSM includes a set of 
“diagnostic criteria,” which provides what symptoms must be present 
and for how long to qualify for a particular diagnosis.281 The DSM 
also includes detailed text that outlines associated features to support 
the diagnosis, the prevalence of the disorder, various subtypes of the 
disorder, the development of the disorder, culture and gender-related 
diagnostic issues, and differential diagnosis.282 In addition, use of the 
DSM increases the probability that different health care providers 
will diagnose the same individual identically.283
The proposed definition is similar to the approach used in 
Vermont’s parity law; however, the proposed definition uses the 
current version of the DSM as a reference manual instead of the 
ICD.284 Unlike the ICD, which includes descriptions of both physical 
and mental disorders, the DSM specifically concentrates on mental 
disorders and is the standard classification of mental disorders in the 
United States.285 Furthermore, this definition offers more 
comprehensive coverage than state statues, such as Nevada’s, that 
only require coverage of a list of six mental illnesses that are 
                                                
276. See id. at 503.  
277. See id. at 491 (arguing that states should expand their parity laws “to 
reference the current edition of the DSM, ICD, or any other generally recognized 
mental illness and substance use disorder classification manual”). 
278. See DSM, supra note 133. 
279. See HHS Rules, supra note 116, at 68,286 (stating that mental disorder 
benefits must “be consistent with generally recognized independent standards of 
current medical practice,” then listing the DSM and ICD as examples). 
280. See DSM, supra note 133. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b(b)(2) (2011).  
285. DSM, supra note 133. 
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considered “biologically based” and “severe” because it offers 
protection of a wider range of mental disorders.286 Distinctions 
between biologically based and non-biologically based or severe and 
non-severe mental disorders are outdated and not supported by 
science.287 Plus, such a distinction denies insurance coverage of a 
variety of prevalent mental disorders.288 Defining “mental illness” as 
all conditions classified in the current edition of the DSM also offers 
a clear result because every covered disorder is specifically listed 
with appropriate diagnostic criteria, unlike state statutes such as 
Maryland’s, where is it unclear exactly which disorders fall under the 
broad, state-created definition.289 To achieve any sort of mental-
health parity, the interpretation of the ACA should protect all 
individuals with psychiatric, intellectual, and developmental 
disorders.290
Critics have attacked the APA, the publisher of the DSM, for 
being exceedingly devoted to increasing the predominance of mental 
illness.291 Furthermore, critics have also commented on the APA’s 
connection to the pharmaceutical industry and purported secrecy in 
conducting research.292 However, these criticisms are not unique to 
the APA, the DSM, or the field of psychiatry.293 Every medical 
practice area has sustained concerns regarding pharmaceutical 
influence and research methodology.294 Furthermore, the APA has 
outlined the revision process it used to create the DSM-V.295
Members from organizations outside of the APA, such as the NIMH, 
the WHO, the World Psychiatric Association (WPA), and the 
American Psychiatric Institute for Research and Education (APIRE), 
were active in the creation of the DSM-V.296 From 2004 to 2008, 
participants from both the United States and other countries attended 
                                                
286. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0455(2) (2014).
287. See Tovino, supra note 134, at 499. 
288. Id. (arguing that eating disorders and autism are usually excluded from 
“biologically based” and “severe” disorder lists even though research shows that 
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289. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-802(d) (LexisNexis 2014). 
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292. Id. at 273-74.  
293. Id. at 274.  
294. Id.
295. See DSM-5 Overview: The Future Manual, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N:
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perma.cc/YZW7-NQGN] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
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a total of thirteen conferences where participants addressed and 
wrote on specific diagnostic questions and topics.297 The results of 
most of these conferences are published in peer-reviewed journals.298
Furthermore, from 2007 to 2012, “work groups” reviewed the 
strengths and weaknesses of the DSM-IV in light of scientific 
advancements to develop the DSM-V’s diagnostic criteria.299 The 
final DSM-Vwas released in May 2013.300 The creation of the newest 
DSM-V was the result of a careful, deliberate, and reviewable 
process with input by individuals outside of the APA.301 In addition, 
as discussed above, several states already use the DSM in their 
mental-health-parity statutes, and the HHS lists the DSM as one of 
the accepted manuals available to states to craft their own 
definitions.302 Ultimately, the DSM is a widely used and largely 
accepted medical tool.303
Traditionally, insurers often claim that expanding mental-
health coverage to cover more mental disorders will increase costs.304
However, recent research shows that general mental-health parity has 
a minimal effect on health care costs and, when combined with 
managed mental treatment, may actually produce a decrease in total 
costs.305 In fact, the research indicated that untreated mental illness 
might actually result in higher health care costs for individuals 
suffering with a mental disorder.306 Untreated mental illness was also 
found to lead to decreased work productivity, increased rates of 
disability, increased rates of homelessness and welfare receipt, and 
increased rates of criminal activity.307 These findings suggest that 
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298. See id. (“The results of 11 of these conferences have been published to 
date in peer-reviewed journals or American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc. (APPI) 
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304. Tovino, supra note 134, at 494.  
305. Id. (stating that the author analyzed the claim “that mental health care is 
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there is a compelling societal and economic interest in treating 
mental illness.308
Another traditional argument is that compared to physical 
ailments, mental illnesses are too difficult to diagnose and treat.309
However, actual research reveals that on average, mental illnesses 
are not more difficult to diagnose and treat.310 In fact, there is not a 
consistent or reliable testing method to distinguish between mental 
and physical illnesses.311 Moreover, the DSM provides a standard for 
diagnosing mental illnesses.312 For instance, each disorder in the 
DSM has a list of detailed diagnostic criteria.313 This criterion 
includes necessary symptoms and the length of time they must be 
present, in addition to other symptoms and conditions that are 
required to be “ruled out” before making a specific diagnosis.314 Not 
only do these criteria increase diagnostic reliability for mental 
illnesses, but they also increase diagnostic efficiency and validity.315
Congress granted HHS the power to promulgate the rules 
governing the mental-health-parity requirements made to the 
MHPAEA by the ACA.316 As a result, the rules and definitions 
created by HHS will apply to all health care plans governed by the 
ACA.317 By creating a specific definition of “mental illness,” HHS 
would ensure that individuals who suffer from a mental illness would 
have access to the same insurance coverage regardless of the state in 
which they reside.318 In addition, individual states should also adopt 
an identical definition in their own health-parity statutes to cover 
health insurance plans that do not fall under the umbrella of the 
ACA.319 Furthermore, HHS should also create a definition of 
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“medical necessity” to curb disparate treatment and confusion 
concerning treatment coverage.320 Creating such definitions will be a 
beneficial next step in the process of improving mental-health 
parity.321
B. Define Medical Necessity at the Federal Level  
Similar to the term “mental illness,” the lack of a specific 
definition of “medical necessity” has caused disagreement between 
courts, physicians, and insurers.322 Without a precise definition of the 
term, insurance companies, courts, and physicians may differ on 
which treatments constitute a medical necessity, resulting in the 
denial of treatment benefits and perhaps even litigation.323 For 
example, the defendant insurance company in Harlick324 denied the 
plaintiff’s claim for coverage of her residential treatment for severe 
anorexia because the plan did not cover residential treatment.325
Although the court agreed that the plaintiff’s treatment would not be 
covered by her insurance plan because it was residential treatment, it 
determined that the state’s parity law required coverage for any 
treatment that was medically necessary notwithstanding 
categorizations such as residential or non-residential.326 The court 
stated that the plaintiff’s treatment was medically necessary because 
her physicians did not believe that outpatient treatment, which would 
have been covered under the plaintiff’s plan, would have sufficed 
since she was 65% of her ideal body weight and required a feeding 
tube.327 As the facts of Harlick demonstrate, the lack of a uniform 
definition of “medical necessity” can lead to an insurer denying a 
claim for treatment that is recommended by a medical professional 
and ultimately deemed “medically necessary” by a court.328 Although 
the plaintiff in Harlick ultimately triumphed over her insurance 
company, other individuals suffering from severe disorders may be 
unable to bring legal claims against their insurers for benefit-claim 
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denials and will either have to forgo necessary treatment or pay for 
the entirety of the treatment.329
Because of these discrepancies, an insurance company may 
deny insurance benefits for treatment that a physician has deemed 
necessary.330 As a remedy for this issue, HHS should model the 
definition of “medical necessity” off of the AMA definition.331 The 
AMA has defined “medical necessity” as: 
Health care services or products that a prudent physician would provide to 
a patient for the purpose of preventing, diagnosing, or treating an illness, 
injury, disease or its symptoms in a manner that is: a) in accordance with 
generally accepted standards of medical practice; b) clinically appropriate 
in terms of type, frequency, extent, site, and duration; and c) not primarily 
for the convenience of the patient, treating physician, or other health care 
provider.332
This definition focuses on what a “prudent physician” would 
conclude based on the evidence rather than the determination of an 
insurer.333 Thus, more decision-making power is returned to the 
provider, and the focus is on a determination of “generally accepted” 
medical opinions rather than the opinion of insurance professionals 
who may not be physicians.334 Under this definition, a “prudent 
physician” is able to use his or her own expertise when determining 
the best possible treatment for each individual patient.335 This 
definition deemphasizes cost and utilization, and emphasizes medical 
quality and clinical effectiveness, which helps strengthen the patient–
physician relationship and increase access to necessary treatments.336
Critics argue that AMA’s definition of “medical necessity” is 
not useful when evaluating psychological services.337 This argument 
is based on the fact that one patient’s necessity will amount to 
another patient’s mere convenience.338 However, this definition 
emphasizes the “prudent physician” and allows that physician to 
                                                
329. See Goodell, supra note 24. Many individuals who suffer from severe 
mental illness are unable to obtain and keep employment, which would make 
bringing a legal claim against an insurance company or paying out-of-pocket for 
treatment nearly impossible. See id.  
330. See AMA, supra note 171, at 3. 
331. See id.  
332. Id.  
333. See id.
334. See id.  
335. See id.  
336. See id. 
337. See FLEISHMAN, supra note 252, at 206.  
338. See id. 
308 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
utilize his or her own expertise when making treatment decisions.339
Surely, a physician who has been working with a patient is in a better 
position to make treatment decisions than an insurance company that 
has never even met the patient.340 Moreover, the argument that one 
treatment may be a necessity for one patient, but only a convenience 
for another could also apply to treatment determinations for physical 
illnesses.341 Thus, the contention that the definition is not workable 
for mental treatments is unconvincing.342  
In addition, proper mental health care often involves input and 
support from the patient’s family, legal representatives, and other 
caretakers because individuals suffering from mental illness are often 
unreliable.343 The current AMA definition does not expressly 
recognize this requirement; however, it serves as a starting point for 
both physicians and insurance companies.344 Plus, the definition does 
not prevent this practice.345 If a “prudent physician” wishes to 
consider information from outside sources when making a treatment 
determination, then this definition allows the physician to do so.346
There is also an argument that even with a specific and uniform 
definition of “medical necessity,” insurance companies will continue 
their current coverage practices and simply ignore or decline to 
follow it.347 However, the AMA definition has been used by at least 
one federal court as a partial remedy for the practice of denying 
claims that fit into an insurer’s definition of “medical necessity.”348
Additionally, the combination of the AMA’s definition of “medical 
necessity” and the DSM’s criteria to define “mental illness” provides
insurance companies with less capability to deny mental-health 
treatment claims.349
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Individual states have traditionally regulated insurance 
determinations, and there is an argument that states should be able to 
experiment in ways to improve insurance coverage for their own 
citizens.350 However, by enacting the ACA and requiring that all 
insurance plans within its scope offer the ten EHBs, Congress has 
made it clear that it intends to manage and improve health insurance 
at the federal level.351 In addition, the variety of ways in which states 
or insurance companies have defined “medical necessity” has led to 
the disparate treatment of those suffering from mental illnesses 
because an insurance company will simply deny a payment claim 
because it determined that the physician-recommended treatment 
was not a medical necessity.352
As discussed above, HHS has wide latitude to create the rules 
governing health care plans that fall under the ACA.353 If HHS adopts 
the AMA’s definition of “medical necessity,” then individuals will 
have the same access to mental-health benefits regardless of the state 
in which they live.354 Furthermore, to also cover plans that are not 
governed by the ACA, individual states should also adopt the 
AMA’s “medical necessity” definition.355 This will ensure uniform 
mental-health treatment benefits across the country.356
Even though the ACA has taken great strides in terms of 
mental-health parity, HHS could enhance the ACA’s effect by 
creating specific federal definitions of “mental illness” and “medical 
necessity.”357 Many individuals will gain health-insurance coverage 
under the ACA.358 However, the positive effects of the ACA are 
severely limited if an individual suffering from a disabling mental 
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illness cannot obtain insurance coverage for the treatment of a 
specific illness due to an arbitrary state or insurer definition of 
“mental illness” or “medical necessity.”359
CONCLUSION
Historically, individuals who suffer from mental illness have 
often been subject to disparate treatment in terms of health benefits 
in the United States.360 This unfortunate tradition comes at a price, 
since many individuals with untreated mental illness have repeated 
contact with the judicial system, the hospital emergency room, and 
homelessness.361 To combat the discrimination against mental illness 
in the health care system, Congress has enacted several laws; 
however, each of them has fallen short of establishing mental-health 
parity.362 Most recently, Congress has enacted the ACA, which 
provides the most comprehensive parity legislation to date.363
However, HHS, the agency in charge of interpreting the ACA, 
has not uniformly or specifically defined the key terms such as 
“mental illness” and “medical necessity,” which will likely result in 
the continued arbitrary application of mental-health-parity laws from 
state to state.364 Although it is difficult to achieve actual insurance 
parity because of the inherent differences between mental and 
physical illnesses, HHS can take steps towards equalization by 
requiring insurance coverage of all illnesses and disorders listed in 
the most current edition of the DSM.365 In addition, HHS should 
create a uniform definition of medical necessity that allows 
physicians to recommend treatment based on their professional 
medical opinion.366 Mental-health parity will never truly be achieved 
if individual states continue to remain split on what establishes a 
mental illness and which treatments are medically necessary.367
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physical illnesses, HHS can take steps towards equalization by 
requiring insurance coverage of all illnesses and disorders listed in 
the most current edition of the DSM.365 In addition, HHS should 
create a uniform definition of medical necessity that allows 
physicians to recommend treatment based on their professional 
medical opinion.366 Mental-health parity will never truly be achieved 
if individual states continue to remain split on what establishes a 
mental illness and which treatments are medically necessary.367 
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